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Of Rights and Reinforcers
DAVID B. WEXLER*
This paper is directed at the intersection between the law and
those behavior modification techniques which are clinical applica-
tions of Skinnerian principles of learning theory or reinforcement
theory. The author has written previously on this subject' and it
is his hope in the present paper to capsulize and update the pre-
vious work, to highlight certain new themes and developments, and
to furnish some recent references.2
The theory of operant conditioning stresses that behavior is
strengthened or weakened by its consequences-that the frequency
of a behavior will increase if it is followed by desirable con-
sequences and will decrease, or be extinguished, if the positive con-
sequences are discontinued or if the consequences are aversive.
* B.A., Harpur College, State University of New York at Binghamton
(1961); J.D., N.Y.U. (1964). Professor Wexler is currently a Professor of
Law, University of Arizona.
This paper is based upon the author's remarks at the Law and Psychia-
try Section program of the Association of American Law Schools in De-
cember, 1973 and at the Law and Society Research Group Symposium at
Florida State University in May, 1974. These remarks will also be pub-
lished in the proceedings of the Florida State University Symposium.
1. Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies,
and the Law, 61 CAIar. L. REv. 81 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wexler].
2. In the interest of brevity, most references other than case citations
and quoted material will not be repeated here if they can be gleaned from
Wexler, supra note 1.
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This article will focus on the process of strengthening wanted be-
havior patterns through rewards-positive reinforcement-rather
than on extinguishing unwanted behavior patterns through pun-
ishments. The principal reason for that focus is that the former
technique operates more subtly and, in this author's opinion, raises
more interesting legal questions. Further, that area is often ne-
glected legally because of the erroneous view-often peddled by
behavior modification proponents-that serious legal problems can-
not arise in a process that deals with rewards rather than with pun-
ishments.
Clinically or therapeutically, behavior modification practitioners
seek to shape and maintain appropriate behavior patterns-desig-
nated as target behaviors or target responses-by rewarding or re-
inforcing the desired responses. Typically, rewards are given in
the form of points or tokens-secondary or generalized reinforcers
-and are later cashed in by the patients for primary reinforcers-
i.e., snacks and canteen items. Behavior modification programs
relying on tokens are typically referred to as token economies.
They seek to arrange and manage reinforcing contingencies so
as to create an optimal motivating social learning environment.
Token economies are now very much in vogue, and are attractive
because they are relatively inexpensive to operate, can be run on
a day-to-day level by ward attendants and paraprofessionals, and
seem non-punitive in nature.
The pioneering work on token economies was performed in the
early sixties by Ayllon and Azrin on a ward of chronically psy-
chotic patients at the Anna State Hospital in Illinois. Disturbed
by the apathy and dependency of those long-institutionalized pa-
tients, Ayllon and Azrin set out to reverse the institutionalization
syndrome by increasing patient activity and neat appearance. Ac-
cordingly, self care behavior and performance of institutional work
assignments were designated as target behaviors to be encouraged
by the payment of tokens. To insure that the tokens would be
redeemable for primary reinforcers that would in fact be desired
by the patients, Ayllon and Azrin learned of appropriate and ef-
fective primary reinforcers by an empirical application of what is
known as the Premack Principle (named for its originator, David
Premack). Simply stated, the Premack Principle holds that fre-
quently engaged in behavior can be used to reinforce low fre-
quency (target) behaviors.
At the Anna State Hospital, the high frequency behaviors that
were converted by Ayllon and Azrin into primary reinforcers pur-
chasable by tokens were determined as follows:
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It was noted that certain patients often hoarded various items un-
der their mattresses. The activity in this case, in a general sense,
consisted of concealing private property in such a manner that it
would be inaccessible to other patients and the staff. Since this
event seemed to be highly probable, it was formally scheduled as
a reinforcer. Keys to a locked cabinet in which they could conceal
their private possessions just as they had been doing with the mat-
tresses were made available to patients.
Another activity that was observed to be highly probable was the
attempt of patients to conceal themselves in several locations on
the ward in an effort to enjoy some degree of privacy. A proce-
dure was therefore instituted whereby a patient could obtain a
portable screen to put in front of her bed or access to a bedroom
with a door. Another event that had a high probability of occur-
rence for some patients was a visit with the social worker or psy-
chologist. This was used as a reinforcer by arranging appoint-
ments with either of these staff members. 3
In addition to locked cabinets, portable screens, and therapy ses-
sions, Ayllon and Azrin established as reinforcers such desired
items and activities as ground privileges, supervised walks, reli-
gious services, personal chairs, writing materials, movies, television
viewing, and commissary items. Under the token economy, all of
these were available only contingently-that is, they were purchas-
able by tokens but were unavailable to patients who had not per-
formed sufficient target responses to earn the requisite token pur-
chase price.
The Anna State Hospital program, when measured solely in
terms of increased work output, was rather successful, but even
there, eight of the forty-four patient participants were wholly un-
responsive. Ayllon and Azrin suggested that those eight patients
were perhaps so apathetic that they could not even be motivated
by the available reinforcers. It was noted that their only high
frequency behaviors were eating and sleeping, and it was suggested
that future programs might have to resort to controlling the avail-
ability of even food and beds in order to establish motivation for
engaging in target behaviors. Several programs have taken the ad-
vice of Ayllon and Azin and have scheduled food and beds as
available only contingently upon token purchase.
Many token economies also operate on a "tier" system, where
certain privileges depend upon the patient's place in the hierarchy.
3. T. Amo & N. AzaN, THE To= EcoNomy: A Mo=VATioNAL
SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND REHABILITATION 61 (1968).
The Patton State Hospital program is one which controls food and
beds and also operates on a tier system. Patients progress from
an orientation group, through a middle group, and finally to a
ready-to-leave group. A psychiatric technician at the hospital,
writing in a nursing journal, described the orientation group:
This group sleeps in a relatively unattractive dormitory which con-
forms to bare minimums set by the state department of mental hy-
giene. There are no draperies at the windows or spreads on the
beds, and the beds themselves are of the simplest kind. In the
dining room the patient sits with many other patients at a long
table, crowded in somewhat uncomfortably. The only eating uten-
sil given him is a large spoon. The food is served in unattractive,
sectioned plastic dishes. So long as he is in this group, he is not
allowed to wear his own clothes and cannot go to activities which
other patients are free to attend off the unit. He may not have
permission for off-the-ground visits, and the number of visitors
who can see him is restricted.
During this time, the patient learns that his meals, his bed, his
toilet articles, and his clothes no longer are freely given him. He
must pay for these with tokens. These tokens pay for all those
things normally furnished and often taken for granted. In the
orientation group most of the things the patient wants are cheap;
for example, it costs one token to be permitted to go to bed, one
token for a meal. Patients find it easy enough to earn the few
tokens necessary for bare subsistence.4
Token economies, both of the tier and non-tier type, have flour-
ished and have been applied to many clinical categories besides
chronic psychotics. They have been applied, for example, to pop-
ulations of the mentally retarded, juvenile delinquents, prisoners,
addicts, and alcoholics. At the Richmond State Hospital in In-
diana, for instance, non-psychotic civilly committed alcoholics were
inducted into a token economy. Prior to the token economy pro-
gram, alcoholic patients were, after a week or so, placed on an
open ward with all available privileges. Under the token system,
however, they were obligated to buy their room and board, and
they had to work their way up a ladder of two closed wards, then
a ward where ground privileges were available by purchase only,
and so on.
Against the above factual and psychological background, we can
examine the legal questions posed by token economies. At this
stage, there is no specific body of law relating to token economies,
but there are analogies and clear trends. Token economies and
comparable behavior modification schemes pose legal problems
both in their designation of target behaviors and in their designa-
tion of reinforcers.
4. Bruce, Tokens for Recovery, 66 Am. J. NuRsING 1799, 1800-01 (1966).
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With respect to target behaviors, for example, the therapeutic
propriety of encouraging patients to perform institutional chores
can easily be questioned. Critics charge that the designation of
that type of target behavior is more a labor saving device than
a therapeutic program. On the other hand, given the background,
skill, and prognosis of chronic patients, job training, even of a rather
menial type, may have therapeutic value. Yet, a recent study
which marshalled the empirical evidence casts considerable doubt
on the efficacy of traditional so-called "work therapy" programs.5
The well known Wyatt v. Stickney 6 case, dealing with Alabama
institutions, dealt with the issue by banning involuntary patient
labor-therapeutic or not-involving hospital maintenance, and
permitting voluntary patient labor-therapeutic or not-involving
hospital tasks only if that labor is compensated by the legally re-
quired reinforcer of minimum wage payments.
The propriety of institutional labor as a target behavior is really
only the tip of the target behavior iceberg. At issue, really, is
the entire question of therapeutic goals and our right or duty to
remake persons. If institutional labor is arguably therapeutic for
chronic psychotics, is it also an appropriate goal for juvenile de-
linquents? Or, if academic proficiency is more important than is
Institutional labor in reforming juvenile delinquents, as the re-
search indicates it is, would it nonetheless be improper to adopt
a law, reportedly being considered by Brazilian officials, that in-
stitutionalized juvenile delinquents be kept in custody until they
reach an acceptable reading level? The question of goals in the
context of behavior modification and other behavior change tech-
nologies is extremely complex and important. It has been gen-
erally ignored in the literature and was skirted by Wyatt. It is
believed, however, that certain legal investigators are now turning
their attention to the problem.
More clear cut, and equally as important and interesting, is what
Wyatt and modern legislative enactments and proposals have to
say concerning legally acceptable reinforcers. The key to the legal
problems associated with reinforcers, of course, is that in order
to use items and events as rewards, it is necessary to begin with
5. Anthony, et al., Efficacy of Psychiatric Rehabilitation, 78 PsYcHoL.
BuLL. 447, 450 (1972).
6. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
a state of deprivation-and that is something which many so-called
non-punitive oriented behavior therapists fail to tell us in selling
systems of reward therapy.
With particular regard to Wyatt, it is noteworthy that the court,
as part of the constitutional right to treatment, established the ne-
cessity of a humane physical and psychological environment in
which patients should be entitled to various specifics as a matter
of minimum constitutional right. The probable impact of Wyatt
on reinforcers may be summed up as follows:
According to the Wyatt court, a residence unit with screens or cur-
tains to insure privacy, together with "a comfortable bed, ...
a closet or locker for the patient's personal belongings, a chair,
and a bedside table are all constitutionally required." Under
Wyatt, patients are also insured nutritionally adequate meals with
a diet that will provide "at a minimum the Recommended Daily
Dietary Allowances as developed by the National Academy of
Sciences." Wyatt further enunciates a general right to have visi-
tors, to attend religious services, to wear one's own clothes (or,
for those without adequate clothes, to be provided with a selection
of suitable clothing), and to have clothing laundered. With re-
spect to recreation, Wyatt speaks of a right to exercise physically
several times weekly and to be outdoors regularly and frequently,
a right to interact with members of the other sex, and a right
to have a television set in the day room. Finally, apparently bor-
rowing from Judge Bazelon's opinion for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Covington v. Harris,7 Judge Johnson in Wyatt recog-
nized that "patients have a right to the least restrictive conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment"-presumably
including, if clinically acceptable, ground privileges and an open
ward.
Thus, the usual target behaviors for token economies would be
disallowed and the usual reinforcers will be legally unavailable.
The emerging law appears to vindicate the assertions of the pa-
tients who, at the inception of the Patton State Hospital token
economy, "pointed out to the nurses that the state had an obliga-
tion to feed them and that the nurses were acting illegally in deny-
ing them entrance to the dining room." Chronic patients at Anna
State Hospital who had to work for screens and personal lockers
to insure privacy would, under Wyatt, have those items provided
noncontingently. According to the 'least restrictive conditions"
rationale of Covington and Wyatt, it would seemingly be imper-
missible to house on closed wards those patients clinically capable
of exercising ground privileges, such as Richmond State Hospital's
admittedly nonpsychotic alcoholic patients who, before the onset
of the token economy program, would have quickly been placed
on an open ward. The identical "least restrictive conditions" ra-
tionale would presumably also invalidate programs, such as the
one at Anna State Hospital, in which ground privileges or super-
vised walks are available only by purchase, and programs in
which outright release from the institution is conditioned upon the
accumulation of a set number of tokens or points.8
7. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
8. Wexler, supra note 1, at 94-95 (non-judicial citations omitted). It
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Wyatt is currently pending on appeal-it has been so pending
for more than a year-but regardless of the outcome in that par-
ticular litigation, Wyatt seems clearly indicative of a patients'
rights trend likely to be followed by other courts and by legisla-
tures. If that trend develops as expected, we should anticipate
seeing substantial litigation involving the propriety of utilizing
various items and activities as motivating reinforcers.
Though Wyatt has so much to say with regard to legally accept-
able reinforcers, that case did not challenge head-on any behavior
modification reinforcement program. Indeed, it does not appear
that any such program was in effect at the institutions in ques-
tion at the time of the Wyatt suit. The only specific litigation
to this author's knowledge involving positive reinforcement pro-
grams is a federal suit by the ACLU's National Prison Project and
others, pending in the Western District of Missouri, challenging
the so-called START program at the Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.9
is possible, of course, but somewhat unlikely, that since Wyatt assumedly
involved a hospital at which a token economy was not in operation, future
cases could construe the rights mandated by Wyatt as being operative only
in the absence of a contingency management program. In any event, how-
ever, to the extent that Wyatt-type rights are cast in statutory form-
which is the distinct trend-those rights would be far less malleable. Sim-
ilarly, it is conceivable that the "least restrictive conditions" rationale of
Covington, which has been construed to mean a right to an open ward
for all patients who could manage ground privileges, could, at least accord-
ing to the Wyatt court's version of the rule, be strained and narrowed
to mean less than that, and could be read as not precluding the availability
of ground privileges by purchase only. For instance, Wyatt recognized the
principle in language to the effect that "patients have a right to the least
restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment."
344 F. Supp. 373, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Behaviorists could argue that,
even for patients able to manage ground privileges, the contingent avail-
ability of those privileges is necessary to achieve the purposes of commit-
ment (treatment), and that a less restrictive environment, such as an open
ward, would therefore not be required. Though Wyatt could of course
be interpreted in that fashion, such an interpretation seems to me to be
somewhat of a distortion of the clear Covington principle.
9. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Ciccone, infra note 11; Steinman, The Case of
the Frightened Convict, THE NATION, Dec. 3, 1973, at 590; Civil Liberties,
Nov., 1973, at p. 3, col. 3 (ACLU newspaper). Citing "economic" reasons,
but also explicitly mindful of the "widespread misunderstanding" of the
program, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons has now decided to dismantle START.
Tucson Daily Citizen, Feb. 9, 1974, at 14, col. 7-8.
START is an acronym for Special Treatment and Rehabilitative
Training, a program which involves a token economy and a step
system. Its announced goal is not to prepare prisoners for their
return to society, but rather to make good prisoners out of bad
ones! Inmates can be transferred to Springfield and to START
from federal correctional institutions across the nation. At the
first level, at least, visitation rights, reading materials, and exer-
cise opportunities are apparently severely restricted. START is
being attacked on two separate grounds, one procedural and one
substantive.10
The procedural due process attack involves the involuntary
transfer of inmates to Springfield and to the program without the
procedural niceties of notice and hearing. It is argued that being
placed in START is easily akin to being placed in segregation with-
out a hearing, and that since the law now finds the latter pro-
cedure constitutionally offensive, the former is an a fortiori case.
With respect to the petitioners' assertion that START deprived
them of many substantive rights, the Government argued in re-
sponse that, therapeutically, it was necessary to strip the inmates
of various rights in order to utilize their reacquisition as carrots
or behavioral incentives. Then, with genuine sleight of hand, the
Government claimed that the fact that the petitioner inmates were
concerned enough to sue over the denial of those rights indicates
that those denied items and activities are in fact desired by the
inmates and are therefore powerful psychological reinforcers.1
While the Government's position may make some psychological
sense, it surely creates a legal Catch 22: if you complain of the
denial of certain rights, you are not entitled to them; you are en-
titled only to those rights the denial of which you do not challenge.
10. The challenge might well have had a third or even fourth prong:
the propriety of the therapeutic goal, and the extent to which the selection
system was particularly fond of inmates who were vocal in their exercise
of political and First Amendment rights.
11. [I]t is obvious that the overall incentive to the participant to be
returned to open population as the basic reinforcer is valid, as all
Petitioners desire such relief herein.
Further, as stated by Dr. Levinson and in essence by Dr. Mennin-
ger, . . . a reduction of any privileges which [the petitioners] may
have had in such units on admission to the START Program was
necessary to provide a basis from which incentives or reinforcers
could be provided, and obviously, if Petitioners complain of their
loss, then these privileges must be incentives.
Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the
Petitions for Habeas Corpus Relief, Sanchez v. Ciccone, No. 20,182-4 (W.D.
Mo.), at 2.
[VOL. 11: 957, 1974] Of Rights and Reinforcers
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Catch 22 or not, many behavior modification proponents are se-
riously concerned that Wyatt and related developments entitling
patients to various desired items and activities as a matter of right
will sap the therapeutic strength from operant conditioning pro-
cedures. The behavior therapists claim that, at least with respect
to apathetic chronics, motivation to learn desired behavior patterns
can be engineered only through the contingent availability of
rather basic items and events. If those items and events are freely
available to the patients as a matter of right, there will, those be-
havior therapists claim, be no motivation and no improvement, and
the patients will be able, with all their rights, simply to stagnate
in the back wards of public institutions.
The recently published case study of a patient at the Nevada
State Hospital nicely illustrates the asserted psycho-legal di-
lemma.12 LM was a thirty-three year old extremely obese woman
who had been hospitalized for the third time for a severe psychotic
depressive reaction. It was apparent both to LM and to her thera-
pists that her obesity was the major factor contributing to her self-
concept of extreme worthlessness and to her poor relationships
with other persons. Yet, she had never been able to maintain an
effective diet, and traditional therapies had proven fruitless in re-
versing her depression or her obesity. Finally, six months into
her third hospitalization, she and her therapist decided to try to
motivate her dieting through a token economy system. It was
agreed that the target behavior of weight reduction would be re-
warded by tokens which could be expended only for the rental
of a private hospital room. According to the therapist, the avail-
ability of a private room as a reinforcer
... proved crucial to the target behavior plan since LM had several
times confided to staff members that the most excruciating mo-
ment of her day came in the evening when she was obliged to
undress for bed in the bare six-patient dormitory to which she
had been assigned. At that time she was forced to expose her
obesity in all its abject ugliness to the disapproving eyes of the
five other women who shared her sleeping quarters.13
As expected by the therapist, the contingent availability of a pri-
vate room did indeed operate as a powerful dietary motivator, and
12. McQueen, The Token Economy and a Target Behavior, 32 PsycHoL.
REP. 599 (1973).
13. Id. at 601.
LM achieved a dramatic and permanent weight loss, accompanied
by a remission of her depression, and is now functioning well be-
yond the walls of the institution. The crucial point to keep in
mind for the purpose of the present discussion, however, is that
under Wyatt, LM would be entitled as a matter of right to the
privacy provided by a room divider or curtain, and hence would
presumably not be as motivated to secure a private room as she
would be in the absence of the rights provided by Wyatt.
In light of Wyatt's potential for drastically curtailing the craft
of behavior modification, it is not surprising that, many behaviorally
oriented clinical psychologists are concerned with the entrance of
the courts in this area, resulting in, they claim, the prohibition, with-
out any psychological expertise of some very well accepted thera-
peutic tools. This concern is easily answered, however, by pointing
out that Wyatt was not decided in a psychiatric and psychological
vacuum, but instead was molded by testimony presented by an
array of eminent experts. Indeed, the American Psychological As-
sociation (APA) participated in Wyatt as an amicus curiae, as did
several other professional organizations, and agreed to the bulk of
the rights ultimately announced by the Wyatt court. This, how-
ever, raises a far more difficult question to answer: Why is it
that the American Psychological Association agreed to a position
so damaging to the traditional institutional practice of behavior
therapy? Was the Association unaware of the implications (per-
haps because no token system was operative at the Alabama in-
stitutions in question)? Or did the APA, perhaps still rather
Freudian in its outlook, simply sell out the behaviorists and the
behavior therapists? Although the answer is not known, it is clear
that the question raises the important issue, deserving of future dis-
cussion, of the role of prestigious professional organizations in law
reform litigation, the formulation of policy positions by those or-
ganizations, and the communication between the organizational
policy makers and the organizational membership.
Despite the apparent acquiescence of the APA in Wyatt-type
rights, it is clear that many psychologists feel frustrated over the
emerging restrictions on their use of reinforcers. As an anecdotal
aside, one instance of the extent to which behavior therapists are
seeking to avoid Wyatt's wrath might be mentioned. Now that,
under Wyatt at least, nutritious meals are required to be provided
patients as a matter of right, a therapist who previously used the
contingent availability of meals as reinforcers is grudgingly com-
plying with Wyatt and offering all his patients nutritious food by
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taking all the courses, blending them together in an electric
blender, and serving the mush-like product at mealtime! The
"mush meal" is freely available to all patients, but those patients
desiring more flavorful meals (and segregated course offerings)
must still pay for them with earned tokens.
If the behavior therapists are correct in their contentions-that
is, if it could be proven that society's assumedly compelling interest
in reforming the mentally ill and other deviants could not be
achieved by any means less restrictive of liberty than the tradi-
tional token economy system and its reliance on rather primitive
reinforcers-perhaps the emerging law in this area could properly
be rethought. The efficacy of the traditional token systems and
the therapeutic necessity for relying on basic reinforcers are, of
course, ultimately empirical questions. Yet, although the matters
for empirical inquiry are still largely open, it seems doubtful, on
the basis of the existing evidence, that the resort to basic reinforc-
ers and full-blown traditional token systems are in fact necessary.
Surely, to the extent that the basic systems have been slothfully
and mindlessly transplanted wholesale to clinical populations other
than apathetic chronically psychotic patients (juvenile delinquents,
prisoners, alcoholics, etc.), it is difficult to believe that only prim-
itive reinforcers can operate as effective motivators. Even with
regard to the chronics themselves, the success of traditional token
systems, at least when measured in terms of release and commu-
nity adjustment (which may be the only permissible measure, for
measures of success unrelated to release and community adjust-
ment may be viewed as legally inappropriate goals) is not all that
high. Indeed, traditional token economies surely seem no more ef-
fective than George Fairweather's impressive system, combining
social psychology and behavior modification principles, for return-
ing chronics to community life.14 Moreover, Fairweather's system,
which employs only money and passes as reinforcers, and which
provides patients with food, beds, ground privileges, and recrea-
tional activities as a matter of right, seems to involve far less depri-
vation than the traditional token economies.1 5
14. Fairweather's work is cited and discussed in Wexler, supra note 1,
at 104-09.
15. The Fairweather system does, however, pose one kicker in gauging
Furthermore, behavior therapists have never been forced to ex-
plore creatively for effective non-basic reinforcers. One beneficial
result of Wyatt may be to induce those therapists to seek reinforc-
ers falling above the Wyatt baseline. It is quite possible that an
exploration for such reinforcers will reveal a sufficient number of
non-basic desired items and activities to motivate even chronic psy-
chotics. Some of the existing literature has already indicated that
even chronic patients sometimes have preferences for such idiosyn-
cratic activities as feeding kittens and eating soft-boiled rather than
hard-boiled eggs and that the patients will perform target behav-
iors in order to engage in those idiosyncratic preferred activities.
The law, or at least the legislatures, can assist the effort of mak-
ing non-basic reinforcers available by considering the removal of
certain legal impediments that now exist with respect to some of
them. The contingent availability of conjugal visits, for instance,
might prove to be powerful incentives for many categories of in-
stitutionalized persons. Similarly, in juvenile correctional institu-
tions, authorities are now presumably precluded from offering cig-
arette rewards even to those juvenile offenders who are already
smokers, though there is general agreement that cigarettes would
have a considerable motivating force on those individuals.'" There
are, of course, a number of countervailing considerations to be
taken into account in removing legal obstacles to the availability
of given reinforcers, but the issues need to be fully ventilated in
order to balance appropriately the competing considerations.
An important legal advantage that can accrue from resorting to
idiosyncratic or non-basic reinforcers is that "to the extent that
effective reinforcers are in fact idiosyncratic, it follows almost by
definition that their contingent availability could not conflict with
its relative deprivation. Fairweather's approach relies on patient task
force groups which are charged with controlling their own members and
recommending the amount of pass or monetary privileges deserved by each
member. In order to promote group cohesiveness, Fairweather's system
permits occasional promotions or demotions, in pass and monetary terms,
of the group as a whole. Thus, unlike the traditional token systems, Fair-
weather's approach has an explicitly punitive aspect-and an aspect of
group punishment at that. Since these elements seem incapable of easy
quantification, it may be impossible to compute mathematically whether
the punitive aspects of the Fairweather model in fact convert that model
into one which is objectively more drastic or restrictive of liberty than
traditional token systems which rely wholly on positive reinforcement.
Presumably, however, that question is better answered by subjective pa-
tient preference or by philosophers than by mathematicians.
16. The author is indebted to Ms. Rhoda J. Keppel, Assistant to the
Dean at the University of Arizona College of Law, for calling to my atten-
tion this information acquired during her tour of an Arizona juvenile facil-
ity.
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the legally emerging absolute general rights of patients."17  In
other words, since there is no constitutional or statutory right to
feed kittens or to eat soft-boiled eggs, the use of those sorts of
reinforcers would avoid the deprivation issues that would arise if
food, beds, ground privileges and other basics were employed as
contingently available reinforcers.
Moreover, although the legal trend is to the effect that drastic
therapies, presumably including behavior modification techniques
resorting to reinforcers falling below the Wyatt baseline, cannot
be performed in an involuntary fashion and in fact require the
patient's informed consent,'8 operant conditioning therapy resort-
ing to idiosyncratic reinforcers or to other reinforcers falling above
the Wyatt baseline can seemingly avoid the tangled informed con-
sent question 19 because such therapy can, in a sense, be conducted
involuntarily without raising serious legal problems. Put another
way, if a behavior modification program is operating with legally
acceptable reinforcers-extra monetary rewards, conjugal visits,
mail order items, soft-boiled eggs, etc.-a patient, even without
consent, could simply be offered those reinforcers, contingent upon
target behavior performance, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. And
if the patient chose to leave it, it would be most difficult for that
patient then to assert a denial of the right to treatment and to
sue for release or alternative treatment. That is because, apart
from the case where it could be shown that the offered behavior
modification treatment program was wholly inappropriate on ther-
apeutic grounds, sustaining a right to treatment claim in that con-
text would bring us perilously close to the legal position, never
seriously advocated, 20 that the right to treatment enables a patient
to select his own brand of therapy.
If, then, effective reinforcers falling above the Wyatt baseline
17. Wexler, supra note 1, at 103.
18. E.g., Knecht v. Giflman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (vomit-induc-
ing drug apomorphine cannot be administered as aversive therapy absent
informed consent).
19. The most extensive judicial discussion of the complicated informed
consent concept in the context of mental health law appears in the recent
unreported Detroit psychosurgery case, Kaimowitz v. Department of Men-
tal Hygiene, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Civ. Ct. of Wayne Cty., Mich., July 10,
1973).
20. Dix, Book Review, 11 Amuz. L. REv. 822 (1969) (discussing various
interpretations that can be given the right to treatment concept).
can be uncovered, the procedure of positive reinforcement to
achieve agreed upon therapeutic goals would not seem to pose se-
rious legal problems. But what if, after a legitimate effort, it is
concluded that such reinforcers cannot be found? This is a diffi-
cult area that requires far more thought, and thus, a simple sketch
of some of the conceptual and empirical questions that come to
mind will suffice for the purposes of this article.
Should the use of traditional token economies (involving below-
baseline reinforcers) be permitted without informed consent? If
we assume that commitment is proper, and that a token economy
is therapeutically effective, should a patient be able to refuse this
or any therapy (assuming it is not, like psycho-surgery, experi-
mental, irreversible, etc.)? Once we have deprived someone of the
most basic right to liberty, is it worth quibbling about whether
that person should be entitled to other rights absolutely or only
contingently? 21
Should the use of traditional token economies be permitted with-
out informed consent at least for those patients who have already
failed under a "less drastic" system, such as Fairweather's ap-
proach? Would the threat of being subjected to the token economy
as a last resort actually provide an additional incentive to improve
while undergoing the less drastic therapy? On the other hand,
if traditional token economy entrance is restricted to those who
have already experienced failure under other treatment schemes,
might the effect of previous failure operate as an independent psy-
chological force to make treatment in the token economy more dif-
ficult than it would have been if the patients had entered the token
economy directly and without having experienced previous thera-
peutic failures? What about patients who do not improve even
under the token system? For how long should they be denied the
basics? If token economy "failure" patients are, after a time, pro-
vided the Wyatt basics non-contingently, and if that general rule
is widely known, will token economy patients be encouraged to
fail for a stated period so that they will then be assured of receiv-
ing the basics indefinitely without effort on their part?
Should operant conditioning procedures that resort to basic re-
inforcers be treated like other drastic therapies and be permitted
only with informed consent? Can we expect apathetic long-term
patients to consent to give up the standard benefits of hospital
21. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 488, 494 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (Once Fourth Amendment rights are infringed by an arrest,
the affected individual retains no further right to privacy in his person
to prevent an incidental search).
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life and agree to participate in a therapeutic system where those
standard benefits will have to be earned? If they do consent,
should they be permitted to revoke their consent at any time, as
the Eighth Circuit in Knecht v. Gillman22 recently required of in-
formed consent to the use of the vomit-inducing drug apomorphine
as an aversive stimulus? If consent is freely revocable in a token
economy setting, so that contingent reinforcers can be converted
to absolute rights by the mere say-so of the patient, does not that
defeat the motivating force of the reinforcers?
This virtually endless stream of questions ought to be sufficient
to convince most people that the black-letter law hornbook on op-
erant conditioning law or the law of scientific manipulation of
behavior will probably not be written this year.23 The field is an
embryonic and fascinating one, requiring conceptual and empirical
research of a multidisciplinary nature. Endless wokk lies ahead.
It is hoped that this paper points to some legitimate areas of in-
quiry for those interested in the field.
22. E.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
23. But see the provocative and thorough article by Shapiro, Legislating
the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Or-
ganic Therapies, 47 So. CAIF. L. REv. 237 (1974), which appeared while
the instant article was in press.
